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Abstract: The development of the self and custom housebuilding sector can work towards increasing
the supply of housing and alleviate some of the strain on the housing market in England. Although
it is not a solution for everyone, improving self and custom housebuilding can add diversity to the
market, increase housing affordability, and produce sustainable homes. This has been recognised
by the UK Government, which has introduced legislation which aims to assist self and custom
builders on the journey to building their own home. The goals of the legislation are to ensure every
local authority in England keeps a register of individuals who want to build their own home, to
consider this register when carrying out other planning functions, and to grant sufficient planning
permissions for those on the register. This paper evaluates the ‘self-build and custom housebuilding
registers’ from the perspective of transaction costs and perceived effectiveness. This is achieved
through semi-structured interviews with local authority planners, private-sector planners, property
developers, and national bodies. The findings of this study identify that the primary transaction
costs occur in the eligibility tests stage of the register application and relate to the uncertainty felt by
applicants post application. The paper concludes that these could be rectified by implementing a
more consistent and fair system. The perceived effectiveness of the register varies considerably. The
paper determines that the policy requires significant change in order to meet the goals it set out to
achieve, which includes model Supplementary Planning Guidance documents and a robust support
system for applicants.
Keywords: self-build and custom housebuilding; housing; development management; policy analy-
sis; transaction costs; effectiveness
1. Introduction
The UK housing market is in crisis. One of the reasons for this crisis is rooted within
the under supply of housing [1–3]. The issue of under supply of housing in the UK was
brought back to the forefront of policy following the Barker Review in 2004 [4]. The general
consensus is that the UK needs to build 225,000 to 275,000 new homes each year, to catch up
with years of under-supply and meet the needs of a growing population [5–7]. Since 1990s,
the country has entered a period of demographic change, where more new households are
formed each year, which has intensified shortfalls in supply of housing [8]. For instance,
the number of households increased by 0.9% from 2018 to 2019, resulting in a total of
27.8 million households in the UK [9]. As the number of households continue to grow each
year, the pressures on housing supply increase, and significant amounts of new homes need
to be built each year to account for the increased and existing need for suitable housing [10].
It is evident that the homebuilding sector in the UK is dominated by the largest
companies, as the eight largest companies build more than half of all new homes [10]. Over
the last 30 years, small and medium housebuilders have struggled to become established
and grow due to economic recessions and challenging policy conditions, whilst large
housebuilders have continually dominated the market [11]. This domination has resulted
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in a homogeneous market controlled by volume homebuilders [12]. Therefore, to meet
housing demand, the government has concluded that the market must become more
competitive and more diverse [10,13]. The government has suggested a multitude of ways
this could be achieved, which are mostly based around planning, to ensure planning
rules set out specific guidelines relating to diversity and provide incentives to diversify
the market [13]. One way includes promoting and supporting self-build and custom
housebuilding as a pathway for people to plan and build their homes and provide much
needed diversity to the housing market.
Self-build and custom housebuilding dwellings as a percentage of national housing
completions in England have historically been very low compared to most developed
countries [14–16]. Only 7–10% of new builds are produced through self and custom
build [17], despite the fact that 53% of people would consider building their own home [18].
This illustrates a major discrepancy between supply and demand. The main barriers self-
builders face include access to finance, land supply, the planning process/regulations and
lack of information [17,18]. To try and eradicate these barriers the UK Government has
produced policy and legislation to aid self and custom builders, most notably, Self-build and
Custom Housebuilding Act (2015), The Right to Build (2015), and the Housing and Planning
Act (2016). One of the main outcomes of these policies and legislations is that, since 2015,
every local authority in England has been required to keep a register of individuals or
associations who wish to complete self or custom housebuilding projects [16]. Furthermore,
each authority is required to consider this register when carrying out other planning
functions and grant sufficient planning permissions. Through this, the government hopes
to support the sector and the large number of people hoping to build their own home [6].
Although research has been conducted into the sector by National Custom and Self Build
Association (NaCSBA), this mainly uses statistical data to investigate how the self-build
registers are being used in each local authority (see NaCSBA, 2020). However, there are
no current evaluations of self-build register policy in England, which use underpinning
theories to draw valid conclusions. Therefore, this research seeks to address if the register
and associated policies are achieving the goals they set out to achieve.
This paper uses two criteria of transaction costs and perceived effectiveness to eval-
uate self-build register policy in England. Transaction costs are all the costs involved in
exchanges or transactions, other than production costs [19], and they influence efficiency
and equity of public policies [20,21]. Analysing such costs enables decision makers to
determine what elements of the register process are successful and what challenges ap-
plicants and local authorities face. Perceived effectiveness is concerned with how well
the parties involved with the policy perceive that it is meeting the goals and objectives it
set out to achieve [22]. Self and custom build policy has not been qualitatively evaluated
thus far; therefore, this research works towards using underpinning theories and criteria
to assess the policy and make recommendations to reduce transaction costs and increase
effectiveness.
The overarching aim of this research is to evaluate the transaction costs associated
with and the perceived effectiveness of the self-build register, according to involved parties.
To this end, three research questions are formulated and addressed: RQ1: What transaction
costs are associated with the application process to the self-build register? RQ2: How do
parties involved with the self-build register perceive the effectiveness of the policy? RQ3:
What are the ways to reduce transaction costs and improve the effectiveness of self-build
register policy in England? The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, it critically reviews
literature and policy relating to self and custom housebuilding and how transaction-cost
theory and perceived effectiveness can be used to evaluate policy. This section highlights
the gap in the literature that this research seeks to address. This is followed by the
methodology section which discusses the research methods used in the research. Next, the
data collected is set out in the findings and analysis section, where each research question is
addressed in turn to determine the findings and make links back to the literature and policy.
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The final section presents the conclusions for each research question, whilst providing
policy recommendations.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Self and Custom Housebuilding
2.1.1. Definition
Self-building can be broadly defined as any form of housing where the first occupants
are involved its construction, this can range from organising the construction to building
it themselves [5,16]. Benson [23] suggests that the variation of routes that can be taken to
produce a self or custom build home should all fall under the umbrella term of ‘self-build’.
Whereas Parvin, et al. [24] use the term ‘self-provided’ to describe the process of those who
will be living in the dwellings taking responsibility for the procurement of their own home.
Although often coined together, ‘self-build’ and ‘custom-build’ housing do have
distinctions [25]. The UK National Custom and Self Build Association (NaCSBA) define
them as follows. Self-build refers to projects that are directly organised, designed, and
constructed by the person and/or group who are constructing it [18]. This definition
encompasses a range of projects, including the traditional ‘DIY (do-it-yourself) home’
where the self-builder would complete the design and construction work themselves. It also
includes self-build projects where the builder receives some help, whether in the form of the
assistance of an architect/contractor or if they use a kit home company. Additionally, many
community-led projects are often considered to be self-build as the group is responsible for
much of the work. In sum, self-build homes are defined here as when “people roll their
sleeves up and get their hands dirty by organising or doing the physical work themselves”
(Wilson, 2017:4). Custom-build on the other hand is a less hands-on approach, as here
NaCSBA suggest that builders are likely to work with specialist developers, who will
ease some of stresses of building your own home. This has resulted in the expansion
of custom-build developers, who can have varied degrees of involvement in the project.
Wilson [18] notes that custom-build developers often provide a ‘menu of custom build
options’, ranging from only providing a serviced plot, building the home to a watertight
stage, or completing the entire construction.
2.1.2. Self and Custom Housebuilding in the UK
The UK is significantly behind the rest of Europe in terms of the self and custom build
market. Data obtained by NaCSBA in 2011 indicated that as little as 7–10% of new builds
in the UK are produced through self and custom build, whilst in France it is 38%, Germany
is 60%, and Austria up to 80% [26]. There is some evidence to suggest that the demand
for self and custom building in the UK is much higher than the supply suggests [18]. A
2011 survey commissioned by the Building Societies Association (BSA) determined that
53% of people in the UK would consider a build-your-own-home project, if they had the
opportunity [18]. However, NaCSBA identified that the number of completions is growing
year-on-year, as 13,210 projects were completed in the 2018–19 financial year, which is a
2.2% increase on the previous year [27]. Overall, it seems that the demand for self and
custom housing is not being met in the UK, but it can be difficult to accurately state the
level of self-build activity as no official data on procurement route are collected [5].
The UK Government policy initiatives regarding self and custom build began to gain
traction from 2011, through a Government-Industry Working Group who produced an
Action Plan to promote the growth of self-building housing [18]. The Action Plan set
out a Vision Statement which highlighted the aspirations of the group to “facilitate the
doubling of the number of self-build homes built annually over the next decade, and to
enable a new generation of younger self builders to deliver their own affordable homes”
(NaCSBA, 2011, p. 2). Further stating that this will be achieved through working with the
government to eradicate the key barriers to self and custom build, which include access
to finance, land supply, the planning process/regulations, and lack of information [17,18].
An important development in this regard was the Self-build and Custom Housebuilding
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Act (referred to as ‘The Act’ in this paper), which was published in 2015. The Act places a
statutory duty on authorities to keep a register of individuals or associations who wish
to complete self or custom housebuilding projects, this is now referred to as ‘self-build
register’. Each authority has a duty to take the self-build register into consideration
when carrying out their functions in relation to housing, planning, land disposal and
regeneration [18]. The government has also issued online guidance to the authorities on
what should be included in the self-build register and how it should be maintained, this
includes applicant eligibility. The website details that relevant authorities could set ‘local
connection tests’ as part of their registers, if they chose to do this, their register should be
completed in two parts. Part 1 includes applicants who meet all the eligibility criteria and
Part 2 includes applicants who meet all criteria, excluding the local connection test [28].
The guidance includes further details stating that authorities should be publicising their
self-build registers through designated sections on their website and requesting optional
additional information regarding plot location and size [28].
Although the self-build registers have been active for nearly five years with the
overarching aim to facilitate self and custom build housing, how do we know if the register
is achieving its goals? NaCSBA [29] and Gingell and Shahab [16] have recently published
research which use Freedom of Information requests to analyse the activities of local
authorities around the self-build register. They show that local authority activity is largely
concerned with managing the registers down rather than managing delivery up, as they
have been found to limit new entries onto registers and remove existing entries [29]. It
is evident that existing research have been concerned with the status of the self-build
registers, but there are currently no evaluations of them. Moreover, there is no research
which considers the general process of the register and the barriers or obstacles applicants
may face. Consequently, this research aims to evaluate the self-build register through the
lens of transaction costs and perceived effectiveness.
2.2. Policy Analysis and Evaluation Criteria
For planning evaluation to be successful it should be systematic and use explicit
criteria or indicators to assess plans, processes, and outcomes [30]. As without this, the
judgement planners make regarding if a plan or policy is good or not, cannot be justified
or validated [31]. In this research, we use two evaluation criteria of transaction costs and
perceived effectiveness to evaluate self-build register policy in England.
2.2.1. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are the costs involved in exchanges or transactions, other than pro-
duction costs [32]. The origins of transaction-cost theory stems from New Institutional
Economics, where the concept was initially developed by Coase [33] as the cost of using
the price mechanism. The concept emerged as an attempt to explain factors that had been
traditionally overlooked in classical economics, which presumed a perfect market [34]. In
transaction-cost theory, the basic unit of analysis is the transaction [35], which includes any
exchange between different parties, from simply exchanging goods and services for pay-
ment to more complex exchanges of information [36]. The three most common dimensions
of transaction costs are referred to as asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency [37,38].
Asset specificity refers to whether an asset which is used to support a transaction can be
redeployed to a higher valued use [39]. As asset specificity increases, so does transac-
tion costs. Uncertainty links to ‘information impactedness’ where there is limited and/or
asymmetric information regarding a transaction, which increases transaction costs. Finally,
frequency refers to the number of times the transaction is expected to take place, where
independent and frequent transactions result in lower transaction costs than infrequent,
long-lasting transactions [19].
McCann, et al. [40] emphasise the importance of considering transaction costs in policy
choice and design, as they can affect the efficiency and effectiveness of policy instruments.
Buitelaar [41] states that transaction-cost theory can be used as an analytical tool in planning
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to investigate and compare institutional arrangements in theory and practice. Research
has shown that if there are high transaction costs involved with implementing a policy,
this will decrease the policy efficiency as they are ‘dead weight losses’ which should
be minimised [42]. According to Shahab and Lades [43], such losses can occur when a
party spends too much time and effort to receive a service or good. Furthermore, it is
likely that the transaction costs which occur when implementing a policy are unevenly
distributed among involved parties, which results in inequitable outcomes [44]. By using
transaction-cost theory to evaluate planning policy, we can identify where such costs occur
and why they are generated and distributed. This would allow policy makers to reduce or
redistribute transaction costs to contribute to better land use decisions [41].
2.2.2. Perceived Effectiveness
Effectiveness can be defined as the degree to which a policy instrument achieves the
goals or objectives it was expected to achieve [31]. It can further be defined as how well
a policy instrument works or whether it works as intended and meets the purposes for
which it is designed [45,46]. Assessing the outcomes of policy instruments is especially
important in the planning system, as the system can be seen as a burden to developers,
it is crucial to understand when policy is successful or failing [47]. One way in which
effectiveness can be assessed is through perceptions, which can be defined as the way in
which an “individual observes, understands, interprets, and evaluates a referent object,
action, experience, individual, policy, or outcome” (Bennett, 2016, p.585). When linked back
to effectiveness, the perceived effectiveness of a policy refers to an individual’s positive
or negative perception of that policy instrument [48]. It is proposed that when a policy
instrument is perceived to be more effective this results in a higher level of intention to
carry out that behaviour [49]. Lubell, et al. [50] build on this by stating that a participant’s
perception will depend on the contribution of the policy towards the collective good
but also their individual gains and losses. Perceived effectiveness has frequently been
used for evaluating policy outcomes. Wan, Shen and Yu [48] considered perceived policy
effectiveness in regard to recycling behaviour. Greiner and Gregg [51] considered how
perceived effectiveness affected farmers’ adoption of conservation practices. However, the
perceived effectiveness of self-build register policy among the relevant parties in England
has not been explored.
3. Methodology
The aim of this research is to evaluate the self-build register policy in England in
relation to transaction cost and perceived effectiveness. The research determines what
transaction costs occur when applying to the self-build register, who they are incurred by,
and how they can be mitigated. Then, it explores how effective the policy is perceived to be
by different parties who are involved with or implicated by it. This enables the researchers
to make recommendations to reduce transaction costs and improve the policy effectiveness.
The primary method of data collection for this research was semi-structured interviews.
The flexibility offered by this data collection method enabled the researchers to address
specific dimensions of the research, whilst leaving space for the participants to offer new
thoughts and opinions [52].
A total of 21 participants were interviewed in order to reach data saturation, whereby
no further insights were being generated from data collection [53]. The participants
included nine public-sector planners involved in the register, five private-sector planners,
three custom-build developers, two planning professionals in charitable organisations, and
two academic researchers. Interviews lasted for a time ranging from 30 to 60 min. The
interviews were carried out largely through telephone or online via Zoom between July
and October 2020, when due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, in-person interviews
were not possible. In order to explore the participants perceptions, open ended questions
were used to encourage them to expound on the topic and avoid short answers [54]. The
questions included asking the participant to break down the application process of the
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self-build register into stages, discussing the time-consuming features of the process, and
asking how well they think the register achieves its goals.
All interview responses were recorded with the prior consent of the participants and
anonymously transcribed. The transcriptions were then analysed using thematic analysis.
Thematic analysis is suitable for this study as it is a useful method for understanding
the perspective of different interview participants and emphasising the similarities and
differences within their responses [55]. To ensure the research questions were fully ad-
dressed through the thematic analysis, each question was analysed in turn. The data
collected from the interviews was grouped into themes under each research question. For
example, research question two involved the analysis of two policy objectives so we began
by collating all the relevant information from the interviews for each objective. We then
identified themes and patterns in the data. This allowed the researchers to structure the
analysis around key themes and the corresponding interview quotes. After the interview
data was structured into a coherent argument, links were established between the analysis
and literature review to solidify the arguments.
4. Results and Discussions
4.1. Transaction Costs Associated with the Self-Build Registers
The process of applying to the self-build register involves a few activities for the
applicant and the associated local authority. Although it is not a lengthy process, the
applicant is still likely to face a number of transaction costs when applying to the register.
This section aims to determine when the transaction costs occur and who incurs the costs.
Each interviewee was asked to explain, in detail, the process of applying to the self-build
register from the perspective of an applicant. From this, each stage of the process has been
identified as follows. The first stage is identified as applying to the register through an
online application process, this is often followed by an eligibility tests to determine if the
applicant has a strong connection to the area. This process can also involve a fee that must
be paid to be added to the register. Once this application has been made, the next stage sits
with the local authority to utilise the applicant’s information. The information obtained
from the interviews is summarised in Table 1, showing the category of activities, examples
of transaction costs and who they are incurred by.
Table 1. Transactions associated with self-build register application, the related transaction costs, and parties involved.
Category of Activities Examples of Transactions Creating Transaction Costs Main Parties Involved
Applying to the register
Finding the relevant information on the local authority’s website Applicant
Entering personal information of individual or association Applicant
Entering information regarding size and location of land plot (not
always mandatory) Applicant
Local connection test Applicant, Local Authority
Eligibility tests Registration fee Applicant, Local Authority
Post application Updates from the local authority Local Authority
The first step in applying to the self-build register involves the completion of an
application form and returning it to the relevant local authority. Although the application
form was described as “clear and concise” and “relatively simple” by several local authority
planners, there are still some small transaction costs that the applicant can face when
applying. First, each applicant must find the relevant page of the local authority’s website,
this may seem like a straightforward task but often the registers are not publicised at all.
Two local authority planners who were interviewed emphasised the lack of publicisation
in their councils, one stated that, “it [the register] is not advertised to the full extent, it is up
there because we have to do it”. Another planner commented that their register should
be promoted in more diverse ways as they have a young demographic that apply, so the
council could utilise social media to reach more potential applicants, as “it is not enough
to just have a page on the website”. The lack of publicisation of the register was linked
to local authorities being cautious to promote their registers, as a NaCSBA interviewee
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noted, if they do promote, they are worried they will have too many applicants and be
unable to fulfil their duties. One interviewed local authority described publicising the
register as “making a rod for your own back” as with more people on the register, they
are required to grant sufficient planning permissions, according to The Act. Furthermore,
they highlighted the lack of resources available to monitor and implement the register,
meaning more applicants would increase the already struggling workload. However, this
has resulted in obstructions to the initial application process as applicants may struggle to
find the appropriate place to apply if the application page is not publicised or clearly visible.
After the applicant has obtained the application form, the process of completing
it is mostly straightforward. As briefly mentioned, every local authority planner that
was interviewed stated that the application form is clear, comprehensive, and easy to
complete. All application forms involve entering the personal information of the individual
or association applying to the register. Most applications require the applicant to submit
additional information regarding preferred location, size of plot, and how they plan to
finance the build. This information is then used within the authority to inform policy
and planning decisions, it is deemed necessary and useful by local authority planners.
However, one developer suggests that requiring additional information from applicants
can hinder the process, as many people “will not have a firm idea of budget and number of
bedrooms when first entering”. The developer continued to explain that inflexible registers
that ‘pigeon-hole people’s requirements’ are likely to obstruct applicants and discourage
those who may not have the additional information required.
The next stage of the application process involves eligibility tests which are set by
each local authority. The scope of these tests vary, as some authorities do not impose any
restriction on joining the register and others use local connection tests and/or charges.
Information obtained by NaCSBA indicates that 31% of councils now impose some sort
of restriction, with 30% using local connection tests and 15% using a charge (NaCSBA,
2020). Evidently, the restrictions are not evenly distributed amongst individuals, results in
an inequitable process [32]. When discussing the local connection tests with authorities
that do enforce it, it was clear that the applicant would incur costs. As they are required
to prove beyond doubt to the local authority that they have a suitable connection to the
area, often through residency or employment-based connections. For instance, an applicant
seeking to pass the local connection test is required to “dig out paperwork/utility bills
etc. from more than three years ago” to submit alongside their application. This process
creates transaction costs for the applicant, as it may be time consuming or difficult to find
the relevant information, which could lead to people abandoning the process if they cannot
obtain the documents they need. Furthermore, it has been questioned if local connection
tests are entirely necessary for the register, as a self and custom build developer highlights,
the tests remove the potential for people to migrate within the country to live or work,
which they argue is “completely at odds with 21st century living and working patterns”.
Therefore, the transaction costs associated with proving you are eligible to be on a register,
which can obstruct and deter applicants, may be unnecessary and avoidable.
In addition to local connection tests, local authorities can charge a registration fee to
applicants who would like to be added to their register. This was introduced in 2017 by the
government, and it clearly states that the fee should only be set on a cost recovery basis
and should reflect the genuine costs incurred by the authority [28]. However, during the
interview with a NaCSBA representative, it was clear that this was not the case for some
local authorities. The interviewee explained that most fees are much higher than the cost
of the amount of work it takes to process an application, one example cost over GBP 700 to
be on the register since it has been in progress. The registration fee is evidently the largest
transaction costs in the application process of the self-build register, as facing such fees
upwards just to register is likely to deter many people and pose a significant barrier to
applicants. Furthermore, many applicants may not be able to afford excessive fees which
result in little return.
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The final stage of the process follows the submission of an application, where the
applicant should be contacted by the local authority. From the interviews, it is clear
that this contact is brief and essentially a confirmation of being added to the register.
The interviewed local authority planners stated that they receive the most queries from
applicants regarding this stage of the process. The queries are often related to the next
steps once they have applied to the register and the misconceptions surrounding the role
of the council. One local authority planner explained a common exchange here:
“I have 10 emails from people asking, so what happens now after they have
signed up to the register and you have to politely say well the council has done
everything that they are legally required to do. So, there is a big issue that
applicants are expecting more from being on the register because it is not clear
what happens next.”
There is a level of uncertainty for applicants, as they are not clear what happens post
application and many expect more help or information from the local authority. This
uncertainty is caused by misconceptions of the registers purpose, as it is primarily used to
measure demand, but interviewees note that applicants are expecting the authority to find
or allocate them a plot. As Alexander [36] notes, limited or unclear information regarding
a transaction will increase transaction costs, which is evident here. Furthermore, the
‘information impactedness’ is negatively affected due to the limited information, resulting
in increased transaction costs [56]. In this case, the transaction costs are incurred by
the applicant and the local authority, as the applicant faces uncertainty whilst the local
authority is required to spend time clarifying the misconceptions.
4.2. Perceived Effectiveness of the Self-Build Registers
4.2.1. Perceived Effectiveness of Objective One: Increasing the Number of Self or Custom
Build Homes in England
The first objective of the policy is to increase the number of self or custom build
homes in England. It aims to achieve this by building on previous government initiatives
and raising awareness of the sector, measuring demand, and providing more support for
people who want to build their own homes. As this objective is not clearly set out in The
Act, it has been determined primarily through analysis of the semi-structured interviews,
when interviewees were asked if they thought the register supported people wanting to
build their own home. This question was derived from Self and Custom Housing Briefing
Paper [18] and the Right to Build: Supporting Custom and Self Build-Government response
to consultation [6], where it is clearly outlined how the government are determined to
support the custom and self-build sector. Therefore, data collected through the semi-
structured interviews and analysis of government documents relating to The Act has
informed this objective. The following discusses how effective the policy is perceived to be
at achieving this objective, from the perspective of key actors.
Overall, the perceived effectiveness of this objective varies between and within the
different parties that were interviewed. This links to Bennett’s conclusion that as we all
have unique experiences and motivations, unlike and even like groups can perceive the
same policy very differently. Public-sector planners, private-sector planners, developers,
and NaCSBA all agreed that in terms of increasing awareness of the self and custom build
market, the policy has been effective. An interviewed private-sector planner noted that the
register has made a distinct improvement to where the sector was 10 years ago. Similarly,
NaCSBA stated that the register has greatly influenced awareness, as “every single local
authority is now aware of custom and self-build”, when this was not the case before
the register.
However, the perceptions of different parties start to vary when discussing if the
register is a useful tool to measure demand. Three local authority interviewees noted that
the register is beneficial to monitor the demand for self and custom build in their authority
and provides a mechanism for the demand to be recorded. However, the NaCSBA repre-
sentative and three other local authority planners question the validity of the measured
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demand. This is due to the difficulties in measuring the sector, as there is no robust method
to counting what houses qualify as self or custom build. As CIL exemptions can be used,
but not all areas enforce CIL charges, resulting in inconsistent data. Furthermore, managing
the registers can be challenging as local authority planners believe many people stay on
the registers ‘just in case’ and have no real intent to build their own home. Moreover, an
applicant can join as many registers as they wish in different authorities, which can result
in double counting and skewed data. These factors contribute to the policy being perceived
as ineffective at measuring demand of the sector and evidently some improvements could
be made to clarify the process.
In terms of supporting people who desire to build their own home, it is evident
from the interviews that this is not being achieved through the self-build register. Most
interviewees expressed their concerns that the register does not go beyond measuring
demand. One public-sector planner stated that “it seems like a tick box exercise as I cannot
help people after they have applied”. Although councils are fulfilling their legal duties
by solely keeping the registers, there is a common misconception by applicants that the
purpose of the register is for authority to find them a suitable plot to build on and further
support the process. As this is not the case, applicants are often left disappointed with the
lack of support. The local authority planners noted that they would like to assist applicants
further but the registers are often not their top priority, or they do not have the resources.
This results in an unsatisfactory experience with the self-build register, which in line with
Wan, Shen and Yu [48], is likely to decrease the perceived effectiveness.
4.2.2. Perceived Effectiveness of Objective Two: Taking Account of the Demand for Self or
Custom Build Homes by Local Authorities When Making Plans and Policies
The second objective set out in The Act is that councils must consider the demand
on the self-build register when carrying out their other functions in relation to housing,
planning, land disposal, and regeneration. This objective is not very detailed in The
Act, it simply states that each council should take regard of the register when carrying
out the functions. Morrison and Pearce [47] highlighted the difficultly in measuring the
effectiveness of policy instruments when they lack clear language or detail.
The interviews have shown that there is an overall disparity in the perceived effective-
ness of this objective between the parties in control of the registers (i.e., local authorities)
and the other parties the register should be supporting (e.g., developers and NaCSBA). As
eight out of nine of the local authority planners interviewed stated that the information col-
lected through their register was being used within the authority when carrying out other
functions, suggesting the policy was perceived as effective. The interviewees highlighted
how the register is being used to inform decision making in their authority. Examples
of this include, reviewing the Draft Local Development Plan to include a policy where
sites of 20 plots or more are expected to provide 5% of plots for serviced self or custom
build. Similarly, another Draft Local Plan is looking to support the sector by encouraging
developers to include 10% of dwellings as available serviced plots on sites of 10 or more
dwellings, where there is an identified need on the register. In one authority, the Planning
Inspector has inserted a policy requirement for developers to provide self-build plots on
new Sustainable Urban Extensions (SUEs). However, each of these policy changes come
with their own challenges. The Draft Local Plan changes have received some objections
from developers, regarding security of sites if multiple contractors are working at the
same time. The developers of the SUEs have raised concerns that self-build plots may
have a detrimental impact on their wider schemes in terms of varying designs and access
complications. As argued by Wan, Shen and Yu [49], when a policy is perceived to be more
effective, it is more likely to be actioned. Therefore, despite the objections, there is definite
progress within the local authorities that were interviewed to consider the demand of the
register when carrying out other functions. The majority perceive this to be working well,
deeming the policy to be effective at achieving this outcome from the perspective of local
authority planners.
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On the other hand, the interviewed developers emphasised that their experience, and
the experience of other developers they have worked with, is that the local authorities
are not doing enough when considering the demand of the register. They stated that the
councils have no interest in taking the register into consideration when deciding planning
applications, which is contrary to the point of the register. One developer expressed specific
disappointment with this, as the main reason they started to pursue self and custom build
schemes was because of the purpose of the register. However, they felt the purpose
was being ignored and the local authorities were “making it as difficult as possible” to
implement the schemes. Evidently, these experiences impact the perceived effectiveness of
this objective. As participants’ perceptions are partly based on their individual gains and
losses [50], it is clear to see why the perceived effectiveness is much lower for developers
due to their negative experiences.
4.3. Addressing High Transaction Costs and Low Perceived Effectiveness of the Self-Build Registers
4.3.1. Reducing Transaction Costs
The analysis of interviews indicated the key transaction costs occur when applicants
face eligibility tests and registration fees. Throughout the interviews, both the local connec-
tion test and the registration fee were described as mechanisms to minimise the number of
entries and suppress demand on the register. In line with Alexander [36], the tests and fee
are exchanges of information and/or payment which results in increased transaction costs.
Here, the transaction costs are heightened because the process is not efficient or equitable.
For instance, the process might not be considered equitable as only 31% of councils impose
some form of restriction. Consequently, one applicant may face complicated eligibility tests
and a large fee to register for one authority, but an applicant registering for the neighboring
authority may face nothing. The differing application processes across the national scale
of the registers results in an inequitable process for applicants, dependent on which local
authority they are applying to.
Furthermore, the eligibility tests and registration fees significantly increase the time
and monetary costs to applicants who face them. As one developer stated, “the fees and
local connection test that authorities have the discretion to apply are completely killing
the sector dead, as they are stifling the real need”. Consequently, it could be argued that
certain authorities are purposely introducing additional transaction costs to the application
process to limit the amount of people who apply and ensure every applicant is serious. In
turn, this decreases the efficiency of the policy as the time taken to complete the tests and
the monetary costs, with little return, can be seen as dead weight losses which decrease
efficiency [42]. As a result, some the interviewed developers and NaCSBA representatives
argued that the eligibility tests and fees should be removed from the register entirely as it
is an unequal process, with very low value for money.
4.3.2. Improving the Perceived Effectiveness
According to the interviews, there are two main issues which are affecting the per-
ceived effectiveness of the self-build register. Firstly, it was highlighted that applicants do
not receive much support from the authority once they are added to the register. Secondly,
developers and NaCSBA perceived the self-build register to be ineffective in terms of
ensuring the council considers the demand on the register when carrying out their other
functions.
Regarding the first issue, although local authorities are not legally required to offer
support, it is significantly affecting the perceived effectiveness for all parties when nothing
happens post application, which suggests this area of the policy should be improved. When
interviewees were asked, “what more could be done to support people on the register?”,
several suggestions were given. Four local authority planners and two developers explored
changing the structure of the register so it could facilitate direct communication between
self and custom build developers and individuals on the register. This way, one of the
developers highlighted, they could “submit plots and sites directly to people who are on
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the register”. However, the data protection issues with this idea must be acknowledged,
as it may be challenging for the local authority to share this information. Moreover, this
is likely to work well for individuals who would like to ‘custom build’ with the help of a
specialist developer but unlikely to assist the ‘traditional DIY home’, which is designed
and built independently [18].
Another suggestion to develop the support given to individuals on the register was
to provide connections and knowledge between those on the register and those working
in the sector, through workshops. Whereby developers, planners, national bodies, and
experienced individuals can all attend an event, which is facilitated by the authority, to
share tips and advice. However, as mentioned previously, many authorities struggle to find
the resources to deal with the register alone, meaning it is unlikely they would be able to
provide this service. Upon further research, self and custom build workshops do take place,
most notably the National Self Build and Renovation Centre in Swindon is a permanent
centre designed to assist self-builders, renovators, and home improvers. The centre offers
three-day courses for people considering a self-build project, at the price of £395. Therefore,
to improve the support given to applicants and in turn improve the perceived effectiveness
of the policy, all authorities should be made aware of existing workshops and centres so
they can advise individuals where to look for the best advice if they cannot provide it. This
could be achieved through a national list of available resources which is made publicly
available. It should be noted that some authorities may already do this, but it was not
mentioned by this sample, indicating a lack of awareness.
Secondly, as previously mentioned, the policy was deemed to be ineffective at ensuring
the council considers the demand on the register when carrying out their other functions. A
NaCSBA representative discussed that the absence of incentive for councils overperforming
and penalty for councils underperforming has resulted in a mixed approach to this objective.
Additionally, they highlight that is often down to the “fiscal persuasion of the council”
to determine if they are using the register data to inform other planning functions. This
should not be the case, as it allows some authorities to do the bare minimum when
considering the demand on the register, deeming it ineffective. Three local authority
planners highlighted the need for more government support and detail on implementing
the policy, which could alleviate some of the inconsistencies in terms of how different
local planning authorities respond to self-build. For instance, several authorities in coastal
areas with very high demand have innovative Supplementary Planning Documents which
identify the process in detail, they suggest a central government framework on how to
develop this could be beneficial. Furthermore, a developer noted that the register should
be more firmly embedded in national planning policy, arguing it “should be placed within
the National Planning Policy Framework, rather than being tacked on in a separate piece
of legislation”. As Lubell, Mewhirter, Berardo and Scholz [50] highlights, perceptions
can be formed around the policy’s contribution to the collective good. Therefore, as the
options suggested could work towards a more consistent approach to the self-build register
across all authorities, it is likely to result in an increase in the perceived effectiveness of the
objective, in terms of the collective good.
5. Summary and Conclusions
To address the housing crisis, the UK Government has adopted different strategies
to increase the supply of housing and to diversify the housing market. Promoting and
supporting self-build and custom housebuilding has been one of these strategies. The
share of self-build and custom housebuilding from national housing completions in the
UK has historically been very low, compared to most developed countries, and the UK
Government has recently aimed to encourage these forms of house building by enacting the
Self-build and Custom Housebuilding Act (2015). The Act has been a notable development
in increasing these types of housing, particularly as it places a duty on local planning
authorities to keep a statutory register of those within their respective administrative areas
who wish to acquire a serviced plot of land and grant sufficient development permissions
Sustainability 2021, 13, 4912 12 of 15
to meet the demand arising on the register. There has been very limited analysis of
these policies thus far, particularly in terms of their associated transaction costs and their
effectiveness in achieving objectives. The aim of this paper is to address this gap by
evaluating the self-build register from the perspective of transaction costs and perceived
effectiveness.
The paper firstly identified what transaction costs are associated with the application
process to the self-build register and what parties they are incurred by. Broadly, the
categories of activities were identified as applying to the register, eligibility tests, and
post application. Overall, it can be concluded that applying to the register is a fairly
straightforward process for the applicant and the local authority. However, each category
of activities involves some form of transaction cost for the parties involved. For instance,
the main barrier facing an applicant initial application is locating the form on the council’s
website, as they are not clearly publicised.
The analysis concluded that the largest transaction costs occur in the eligibility tests
stage. As to become part of some registers, applicants are required to pass a local connection
test and pay a registration fee. Passing the local connection test can require considerable
time and effort from the applicant as they are required to prove beyond doubt that they have
a connection to the area. Furthermore, registration fees are often extortionate compared
to the service provided. Both pose significant barriers and costs to the applicant during
the process.
Furthermore, uncertainty regarding the post application process also presents trans-
action costs for the applicant and the local authority. It is unclear to applicants what to
expect once registered and they often expect more assistance than the local authority is
legally required to provide. This results in uncertainty which increases transaction costs
for the applicant. Whilst the local authority is required to spend time and human resources
explaining that they have fulfilled their legal duties and do not need to assist further.
The paper also evaluated the perceived effectiveness of the self-build register, from
the perspective of involved parties. The perceived effectiveness of policy instruments is
measured through how well the policy is seen to be achieving the objectives it set out
to achieve. The objectives of the self-build register were identified as aiming to increase
the number of self and custom-build properties in England and ensuring the register is
considered when councils carry out their functions relating to housing, planning, land
disposal, and regeneration.
Objective one aims to increase the number of self and custom-build properties through
raising awareness of the sector, measuring demand, and providing more support for people
who want to build their own homes. This objective was determined through interview
analysis and supporting government documents which clearly set out the intent to grow
and support the sector. In terms of raising awareness, all interviewees concluded that
the policy is effective, as the nationwide implementation has significantly increased the
awareness. When measuring demand, the perceived effectiveness of the policy varies as
some local authority planners think it provides a useful mechanism to measure. However,
others question the validity, as applicants can apply to multiple registers resulting in
distorted demand data. Finally, the policy is deemed to be ineffective at supporting people
who want to build their own home, as local authorities are not legally required to provide
any support, following the application. However, there is a common misconception
among applicants that they will receive support, resulting in the policy being perceived
as ineffective.
The second objective is concerned with how the self-build register data is used within
each authority. As The Act states that councils must consider the demand on the self-
build register when carrying out their other functions in relation to housing, planning,
land disposal, and regeneration. The analysis concluded that there are major differences
between how different parties perceive the effectiveness of the register regarding this
objective. Local authority planners perceived the policy to be effective at achieving this
objective, as the information is being utilised within the authority. Multiple examples were
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given of the data influencing Draft Local Plans and Planning Inspector policies. However,
interviewed developers and NaCSBA representatives contended this as they stated the
local authorities they had worked with for self and custom build projects had no interest
in considering the register and appeared to make projects very difficult. These negative
experiences have resulted in the policy being perceived as rather ineffective by developers
and NaCSBA.
The research discussed how the eligibility tests and registration fee process can be
modified to reduce transaction costs they produce. It concludes that the process is not
equitable for applicants at a national scale, as some applicants will face high transaction
costs regarding tests and fees but others, in different local authorities, will not encounter
anything. Furthermore, it was determined that the process is not efficient. As there is
limited support for applicants on the register, the time and monetary costs it takes to
complete the eligibility test and pay large fees can be seen as dead weight losses, which
decrease efficiency. As a result, the research recommends the policy should be amended to
ensure it is consistent across all local authorities. Additionally, the eligibility tests should
be removed as they prevent natural migration patterns within England.
In terms of perceived effectiveness, the key issues were identified as the lack of support
from the local authority and councils not considering the demand of the register when
carrying out their other functions. To provide more support for applicants, it was suggested
that the policy was modified to facilitate direct communication between developers and
individuals on the register and more information was provided through self and custom
build workshops. Furthermore, to ensure the demand on the register is considered by all
authorities, greater government support should be given to planning authorities through a
central framework, which could use examples from successful coastal areas. Consequently,
it is recommended that the policy is revised by central government to include a robust
support system for individuals on the register, which could include forming connections
with developers and/or experts. It is further recommended that guidance on how to
successfully incorporate self and custom build into local planning is developed, this could
be achieved through model Supplementary Planning Guidance documents or Local Plans.
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